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n a relatively brief paper, Alan Auerbach takes on a large task 
of trying to summarize and draw some conclusions from a 
quarter century’s experience with fiscal policy. With a series of 
charts and tables, he provides a survey of the major themes in 
fiscal policy since the early 1970s; but the focus of the paper is 
on the effort to control the budget deficits that emerged after 
1981. Auerbach argues convincingly that the 1981 tax 
reduction was the dominant event of the period and that it 
strongly influenced the future direction of both tax and 
expenditure policies. In my remarks, I would like to extend his 
theme by trying to ask what has changed as a result of our 
experience over the past twenty-five years. In that regard, I am 
most struck by two major innovations. First, in contrast to the 
late 1960s and early 1970s, fiscal policy has nearly disappeared 
as a serious tool of short-term stabilization policy. Second, 
after more than a decade of bitter partisan battles and frequent 
pronouncements of doom by economists, the budget deficit 
itself also simply disappeared.
In part, the decline in fiscal policy is simply a reflection of 
political partisanship that impedes cooperation on economic 
policy. But beyond the political factors, there are important 
economic reasons for its fading role. The stature of monetary 
policy has grown enormously compared with the 1970s. That 
ascendancy reflects a combination of change in the economic 
environment in which monetary policy operates, new insights 
into how to conduct it, and a continuing evolution of the 
longstanding debate within the profession about the relative 
effectiveness of monetary and fiscal policy. U.S. monetary 
policy also emerged in the 1980s with a clear and simple set of 
policy priorities, something largely absent from fiscal policy.
However, before we write off fiscal policy too quickly as an 
unneeded redundancy, it is worthwhile to note that the 
ascendancy of monetary policy has occurred during a period in 
which the United States was faced with an extraordinary, 
benevolent economic environment. There have been no 
unfavorable economic shocks comparable to the energy price 
increases of the 1970s, and slow growth in the rest of the world 
has provided the United States with substantial gains in terms 
of trade. I think we can all agree that the primary credit 
accruing to the monetary authorities is that they have done 
nothing at a time when nothing turned out to be the best 
policy. Regardless, monetary policy has become the primary 
tool of short-run stabilization, with fiscal policy relegated to a 
backstopping role. That development has had the added 
benefit of allowing the focus of fiscal policy to shift toward 
longer term goals such as promoting economic growth.
Another surprise has been the dramatic reversal of the trend 
in the fiscal balance within the past few years. For more than a 
decade, large and growing budget deficits were at the center of 
any discussion of American budgetary policy. The inability of 
the Congress and the President to cooperate on a program of 
deficit reduction was central to the creation of a highly partisan 
paralysis of the federal government throughout the late 1980s 
and most of the 1990s. Yet today, the outlook is for a future of 
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large and rising budget surpluses; and most surprising of all, 
that appears to have occurred without the Congress and the 
President changing policy in any considerable way.
The magnitude of the revisions to the outlook is highlighted 
in Chart 1, which shows the progression of the ten-year budget 
projections, based on current policy, of the Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO) from 1997 to the present. As recently as 
early 1996, the outlook was for large and ever-growing deficits 
that were expected to be about $375 billion by 2005. Today, 
those same current policy projections show a surplus of 
$300 billion by 2005, a turnaround of more than 30 percent of 
government outlays. Those revisions can be divided into three 
components: legislative actions, changes in the economic 
projections, and technical reestimates. Except for actions taken 
in 1997, legislative changes have played a trivial role in the 
changed outlook. And even in 1997, the Congress acted only in 
the sense of imposing discretionary spending limitations on 
future congresses. 
Over the three-year period, the changes have been about 
equally split between revisions to the economic outlook and 
technical changes. In the summer of 1997, the CBO raised its 
estimate of the long-run growth rate from 2.0 to 2.3 percent 
annually and lowered the projected bond rate by half a 
percentage point. In addition, revisions to the national accounts 
indicated a much higher proportion of the GDP going to taxable 
forms of income. The result was a shift in the projected balance 
for fiscal year 2005 of more than a full 1 percent of GDP. 
Further upward revisions can be anticipated in the year ahead.
The technical changes can be traced in part to lower rates of 
growth in the medical programs, but the big surprise has been 
on the revenue side, as personal income tax receipts have been 
far above expected levels in 1995-98. It has been difficult to 
account fully for the surge in revenues. There is a substantial lag 
in the availability of detailed data on personal income taxes, 
and there are two major competing explanations: a higher-
than-expected flow of capital-gains taxes and a concentration 
of the aggregate income gains among high-income individuals 
with high marginal tax rates. At present, data are available only 
through 1997 and they suggest that both factors have been 
important, but the biggest contribution is from unexpectedly 
high capital-gains taxes. Initially, the CBO treated the revenue 
surprise as a transitory phenomenon and reduced the effective 
tax rate in future years, but it is now projected to continue 
indefinitely. There are, however, no new projected April 
surprises.
The current budgetary outlook is summarized in Chart 2. It 
is evident that the projected balance for the total budget is 
heavily dominated by the surplus in the Social Security 
account, which will continue until the baby-boom generation 
reaches retirement. Both political parties have pledged to save 
the Social Security surplus, and that statement is interpreted as 
necessitating a surplus or balance in the non–Social Security 
(on-budget) accounts.
Exclusive of Social Security, the Congress will find it 
difficult to achieve balance in the fiscal year 2000 budget and 
beyond because the discretionary spending caps imposed in 
1997 will become progressively more difficult to meet. In 
essence, discretionary expenditures, representing about 
one-third of the budget, are capped at their current nominal 
values. Furthermore, the effective tax rate is assumed to stay at FRBNY Economic Policy Review / April 2000 27
its current high level. On that basis, the on-budget surplus 
would be substantial in future years, exceeding $100 billion 
annually after 2005. But if discretionary spending is assumed 
simply to grow in line with inflation, there is no significant 
surplus.
Auerbach wants to argue that the current surpluses are 
illusionary because the Social Security trust fund will be in 
substantial deficit, beginning a quarter century from now. That 
is true, but I do not believe that it will negate the economic 
effect of a large surplus today. I doubt that projected unfunded 
future liabilities have the same effect as spending today, and I 
am not sure that the calculation of an infinite-horizon budget 
balance helps the public or the Congress to evaluate the budget 
options before us. Unlike Auerbach, I would prefer to separate 
the public retirement funds from the rest of the budget and 
argue for a steady shift toward greater funding and a reduced 
emphasis on a pure “pay-as-you-go” approach. Much of the 
current discussion focuses on the distinction between 
discretionary spending and entitlements; but I think it 
misstates the issue to some extent. I agree with the point in 
Auerbach’s paper that the more relevant problem lies in the 
dominant role of budget programs that benefit the elderly.
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